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Abstract River-based cage aquaculture in Northern Thai-
land involves dealing with a number of climate- and weather-
related risks. The purpose of this study was to improve
understanding of how farmers make investment decisions in
their fish farms when faced with risks from floods that are
imperfectly known, and which may be changing. A role-
playing simulation game was created to capture some of the
key features of the decision-making context and exploredwith
farmers in the field. In-depth interviews were conducted post-
game to reflect on strategies used in the game as compared to
in practice. As hypothesized, more frequent or larger impact
floods reduced cumulative profits. Farmers reduced their
stocking densitieswhenplaying in gameswith high likelihood
of floods, but did not do so in gameswith large impactswhen a
flood occurred. Contrary to initial expectations, farmers were
less likely to learn from experience—choose the optimal
density and thus improve score within a game—when floods
were commonor had large impacts. Farmers learntmostwhen
risks were decreasing and least when they were increasing.
Providing information about likelihoods prior to a game had
no impact on performance or decisions. The methods and
findings of this study underline the importance of under-
standing decision-making behaviour around risks for climate
risk management. The novel combination of experimental,
role-playing, and qualitative methods revealed limitations in
common assumptions about the ease of learning about risks
from previous experiences. The findings also suggest that
decision-support systems for aquaculture need to take into
account how recent experiences, understanding of informa-
tion, and other factors influence risk perceptions and
decisions.
Keywords Risk management  Decisions  Role-playing
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Introduction
Farmers must often make decisions about their crops with
only limited information about the probability and conse-
quences of particular types of extreme weather events,
seasonal patterns or change in climate (Wood et al. 2014;
Crane et al. 2010). Under these conditions, farmers may
learn about risks through experience or description; that is,
information provided by others (Dutt and Gonzalez 2012a).
Risk refers to uncertainty about the likelihood and conse-
quences of an event with respect to something humans
value (Aven and Renn 2009). Perceptions of climate-re-
lated risks are affected by personal experiences of weather
and observations of impacts, and thus often differ region-
ally (Higginbotham et al. 2014; Manandhar et al. 2011).
In practice, learning from experience is a dynamic task
as key decision conditions change as a result of both
external factors and past decisions (Lejarraga et al. 2010).
Learning from experience, individuals may be able to
improve their decisions with time; for example, by getting
a better understanding of likelihoods or outcomes (Erev
et al. 2010). Many studies suggest that people are often
more strongly influenced by what they learn from
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experience than from descriptions that require analysis and
cognitive effort (Weber 2010; Dutt and Gonzalez 2012b).
There are also important limitations from learning from
experience; for instance, people tend to overestimate like-
lihoods of conspicuous and recent events, but also deny
extremely negative outcomes (Ogurtsov et al. 2008).
Uncertainty influences what can be known about risks.
Farmers often are highly sensitive to ambiguity in risks, in
addition to being generally risk-averse (Alpizar et al. 2011;
Engle-Warnick et al. 2011).
Risk decisions are influenced by an individual’s risk
knowledge and the situation in which a decision is made
(Fig. 1). Risk-taking may depend on whether or not a farmer
is already in debt or they have just suffered a major loss, or
have accumulated profits (Jakobsen 2013). For example,
Italian apple growers who have experienced greater losses to
weather events in past seasons, perceived risks for the cur-
rent growing season to be higher (Menapace et al. 2013).
Perceptions and subjective beliefs are also likely to influence
evaluation of probabilities of adverse events, and more
broadly, attitudes towards risk and thus decisions (Breakwell
2010). Gender and other traits are often associated with risk
attitudes, perceptions, and decisions (Figner and Weber
2011). Women are typically found to be more concerned
with risks, at least in part because they are also more vul-
nerable (Breakwell 2010). Emotions such as fear or dread
have also been shown to play a significant role in decisions
about risk (Sjöberg 2007; Slovic et al. 2004). Other con-
textual factors potentially important to the causal chain of
risk decisions (shown in Fig. 1) include social relations,
which amplify risks (Kasperson et al. 2003), and institutions,
which influence risk information flows like early warning
systems and markets (Chinh et al. 2014).
Only a few studies have looked closely at risk percep-
tions and decisions in aquaculture. Salmon farmers in
Norway rated the most important sources of risk as future
prices, diseases, and institutional changes (Bergfjord
2009). Similarly, mussel farmers in Denmark were most
concerned about risks related to prices and government
regulations (Ahsan and Roth 2010). Catfish farmers in
Vietnam (Le and Cheong 2010) and the USA (Hanson et al.
2008) perceived price and production risks from diseases as
more important than those related to weather. Tilapia
farmers in the central region of Thailand rate risks of dis-
ease outbreaks and water pollution highest, and noted that
these risks appeared to vary seasonally (Belton et al. 2009).
A modelling study showed that profits from rearing shrimp
in Mexico could be increased by adjusting stocking den-
sities to match differences in risks related to uncertainty in
temperatures in different seasons (Villanueva et al. 2013).
Thus, while there is increasing understanding of which
risks are perceived as important in aquaculture, less
attention has been given to risk decisions.
The purpose of this study was to improve understanding
of how fish farmers in Northern Thailand make cage
stocking decisions when faced with risks that are imper-
fectly known, and which may be changing. River-based
cage aquaculture involves dealing with a number of cli-
mate- and weather-related risks. Fish farmers, for example,
make decisions about when to stock fish into cages and at
what density. In making these decisions, they must take
into consideration the likelihood of losses due to floods or
low flows, as well as seasonal differences in temperature,
all of which influence growth rates and likely prices at time
of harvest. Information about future conditions is imper-
fect, and farmers vary in how much prior past experience
which they can draw upon to evaluate likelihoods and
consequences of adverse events like floods (Lebel et al.
2015c). Differences in location—both at regional and more
local scales—influence exposure and contribute to differ-
ences in perceptions about the importance of various cli-
mate and non-climate-related risks (Lebel et al. 2015b). In
this study, a role-playing simulation game was used to
explore risk decisions.
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework for learning about climate-related risks and making decisions
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Role-playing games have been used to help stakeholders
understand natural resource management challenges. Sim-
ulation modelling and role-playing games can support
discussions and learning among stakeholders, for instance:
about the collective impacts of harvesting in a subsistence
fisheries in the Philippines (Cleland et al. 2012) and central
Thailand (Worrapimphong et al. 2010); or, upland water-
shed land-use and management in Northern Thailand
(Barnaud et al. 2007) and France (Souchère et al. 2010). In
another application, role-playing games were used to help
smallholder farmers in Morocco learn about options, and
then with a supporting simulation, design a drip irrigation
project (Dionnet et al. 2008). The condensing of time and
space in simulation games is important as it allows
exploration of alternative scenarios (Vieira Pak and Cas-
tillo Brieva 2010). Experiments with simulation games
with water managers in the Netherlands, although not
conclusive, suggested that such games can help commu-
nicate the uncertainties of climate change and the possi-
bilities of adaptive water management (Van Pelt et al.
2015). Simpler games have been used to improve the
understanding of risks by individuals (Ancker et al. 2011),
and in the case of climate change, were shown to be more
effective than just providing descriptive material (Dutt and
Gonzalez 2012a). Role-playing games can also be used to
understand how various contextual or situational factors
influence decision behaviour (Vieira Pak and Castillo
Brieva 2010).
The role-playing simulation game used in this study was
created to capture some of the key features of the decision-
making context in Northern Thailand aquaculture and
explored with farmers in the field. So that key contextual
factors could be systematically and experimentally investi-
gated, the model and game were kept relatively simple.
There was only one role: farming fish. The study focused on
just one key decision—initial stocking density—which
farmerswidely reportedwas a factorwhich theymanipulated
tomanage risks fromfloods, and is closely related to the level
of investment in a particular crop. The specific research
questions addressed in this studywere as follows: (1)Howdo
farmers evaluate levels of risk, including likelihoods and
impacts, when these are fixed or varying, to make decisions?
(2) How does information, investments in adaptation and
insurance or compensation influence risk decisions? and (3)
How do recent losses influence the next risk decision?
Methods
Study area
This study was carried out with fish farmers in Northern
Thailand that reared Tilapia in open-top mesh cages
suspended on floating platforms in major rivers (Lebel
et al. 2013). In this culture system, fish fingerlings aged
2–3 months are released into river cages at densities of
around 20–100 fish m-3 and reared for a further
3–5 months using commercial pellet feeds. Four growing
regions are distinguished (Supplement 1). The climate in
all regions is highly seasonal with most rain fall between
May and October. The river flow regimes of these four
regions differ: peak flows in the Upper Ping are strongly
associated with tropical storms or monsoon anomalies,
especially towards end of wet season (Lim et al. 2012). In
the Upper Nan, in particular, the seasonality of peak flows
is substantially modified by the operations of Sirikit Dam
(Lebel et al. 2015c).
Flood risk pay-off matrix model
A simple model for flood-related losses from fish farms
was constructed based on empirical survey findings (Sup-
plement 2). Nevertheless, there were several important
differences between the model and the decision context in
real world (Table 1). The model, for instance, simplifies
reality: treating stocking level or density as a proxy vari-
able for level of investment, and thus the riskiness of a
cropping decision. In addition, only flood risks were con-
sidered; whereas in reality, farmers in some locations must
also consider the risks from extreme low flows in the dry
season. We considered a more complicated, two-risk ver-
sion of the model with an explicit calendar, but decided
against it, because we did not yet have a good enough
understanding of risk decision-making in simpler contexts,
to be able to design more complex mixtures of slower-
onset (low flow) and more uncertain (high flow) risks.
Another difference was that, in the model, the impact of a
flood on the value of a harvest was amplified (Table 1), to
sharpen the contrast in pay-offs between less and more
risky options farmers were asked to make in the game. The
graph in Fig. 2 shows the expected pay-offs for each fixed
level stocking strategy across a range of flood probabilities.
From the graph, it is clear that with this pay-off structure,
the optimal stocking density varies from high density at
low probabilities of floods (0.1), through middle density at
intermediate probabilities (0.3), to low density at high
probabilities (0.5).
The simulation game
The flood risk model was turned into a simulation game as
an Android application. In the role-playing game, farmers
play a person like themselves, that is, a fish farmer. The
game is played on a touch screen hand-held tablet. The
main idea of the game is to maximize cumulative profit by
choosing among three options: low, medium, or high
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stocking density. After selecting an option, the game
responds with a harvest graphic, pay-off value and cumu-
lative total (Supplement 3). In the event of a flood, a cor-
responding animation appeared.
A session with a farmer started with a very brief
explanation on how to use the hand-held tablet device to
make stocking decisions in each round. Farmers were told
that that if there was no flood, then a higher stocking
density means more profit, but if a flood occurs, then lower
stocking density means less loss. Farmers were not told the
level of risk of a flood or specific pay-offs, except in
specific treatments (T12–T14, Supplements 4 and 5) used
to test the effects of information. Each game lasted 20
rounds or crops, that is, 20 stocking decisions.
Farmers played seven games corresponding to different
treatments. In pretests with students and farmers, we learnt
that attention begins to fade after around ten games,
whereas with seven, players maintained concentration. On
average, each game took about 3.5 min to play. This
compression of time between stocking decisions, it should
be acknowledged, is another important way in which the
decision context in the game differs from reality (Table 1).
Table 1 Summary of key similarities and differences between real world and role-playing simulation game
Feature Real world observed
range (10th–90th
percentile)
Simulation game value(s) or
range
Key differences between game and
reality
Likelihood of a flood or high flows with
negative impacts
0.0–0.67 0.1–0.5 Similar likelihoods of flood
Likelihood of low flows with negative
impacts
0.0–0.50 Not included Did not consider slow flow risk in dry
season
Time between stocking cage(s) decisions 1–9 months 3–10 s Compresses time between decisions
Harvest value: input costs 1.04–1.39 2 Harvest, and thus profits, relatively high
if no flood impact
Fraction of harvest value lost if flood
impacted
0.01–0.30 0.15, 0.65, 1.0 Loss of harvest relatively high if floods
for riskier decisions
Ratio of non-harvested loss to input costs if
flood
0.01–0.4 1.7 Non-harvested loss relatively high if
floods
Profit last crop 0–80,000 baht -10 to 55 thousand baht Similar range. Gains and losses in game
in units of thousands of Baht
Sources of information about flood
impacts, climate and likely river flows
Multiple, including
other fish farmers
Limited to experience in game
and from game screen
Limited sources of information in game
Fig. 2 Expected pay-offs from
adopting single stocking
strategy
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The order in which games were played was randomized to
minimize order effects. Each time they began a new game,
farmers were told to imagine starting farming in a new
location where risks and consequences may be different
from earlier games. In nine cases, problems with tablets
meant the farmer played only six recorded games rather
than seven. All decisions made by farmers and the pay-offs
were recorded automatically in a database in the tablet for
later analysis. Across all crop decisions, farmers chose: low
(27.1 %), mid (40.2 %), and high (37.7 %).
We considered rewarding players depending on how high
they scored in the game, but because of the different treat-
ments they played, this would have been unfair. Moreover,
additional discussions with farm leaders suggested that they
would take the task seriously even without such an incen-
tive, and that they would prefer that all players received the
same small allowance intended to cover local travel costs
and their time, which is what we did.
In the end, a total of 224 fish farmers played the risk
game: 54 % men and 46 % women. The distribution of
player ages was as follows: \30 (7 %), 30–39 (17 %),
40–49 (29 %), 50–59 (29 %), and 60? (18 %). Approxi-
mately equal numbers were drawn from four growing
regions: Upper Ping, Lower Ping, Upper Nan, and Lower
Nan. All fish farmers included had recently reared tilapia,
but in seven cases were currently rearing only other
species.
Experimental treatments
Each game was an experimental treatment which in various
combinations would allow comparisons that could address
the specific hypotheses posed. The set of all treatments
used is summarized in Supplements 4 and 5. As a conse-
quence of a programming error, treatment 8 was the same
as 1 and treatment 9 the same as 5, so findings for these
were pooled. A priori, planned contrasts used to test each
hypothesis are given in the tables in the results section of
the paper.
Measurement of risk decision variables
Six indicator variables were derived from the simulation
game runs to describe different aspects of decisions made
by players: first were two measures of overall performance:
cumulative profit (CP) and random standardized profit
(RSP, Table 2); second was a measure of the level of risky
decisions taken: the mean density level (MDL); and third
were three measures of risk learning: the proportion of
crops for which the optimal level for that type of game was
chosen (ODI), the improvement in profit in second-half
compared to first-half of the game (RLR), and that
improvement standardized with respect to actual number of
flood events experienced (RSRLR). In this paper, learning
about risks was thus inferred either from the ability to
perform better in one game than another (ODI), or from
improved performance within a game (RLR, RSRLR).
Qualitative information
Most participants were interviewed in-depth after they had
completed the game. The short (15-min) discussions cov-
ered: strategies used in the game to increase profits; simi-
larities and differences between game and reality; and what
games they liked and how they felt about making risk
decisions. Interviews were carried out in the Thai language,
taped, transcribed, and coded using the NVIVO software.
Translations of illustrative quotes to English were done
only in the final stage of preparation of the manuscript.
Data analysis
Specific hypothesis about the effects of various game fac-
tors on decision measures was tested by using a priori
Table 2 Measurement of key risk decision indicator variables
Variable Definition












Mean density level Mean density level chosen MDL = (
P
i=1
20 (di))/20 where di = 1 if low, 2 if mid and 3 if high
Optimum decision intensity Proportion of times chose optimum density for that game. ODI = (
P
i=1
20 (Pi = Pmax))/20
Risk learning rate








Risk learning rate standardized against expected if played randomly
RSRLR ¼ ð
P20
i¼11 ðPi  PrandÞ 
P10
i¼1 ðPi  PrandÞÞ=10
where Prandis based on number of flood events in that time period
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contrasts of treatment means within an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) framework. Making specific comparisons
among means in line with the logical structure of the
hypothesis was preferred over indiscriminate comparisons
of all means, because it reflects that logic and is statistically
much more powerful. In preliminary analysis, game num-
ber was included as a predictor to adjust for possible
learning across games, but as it was not significant, this
was dropped. In the analysis, games were treated as inde-
pendent and the blocking with respect to farmers ignored.
The primary purpose of using incomplete, partial blocks
was to ensure reasonable interspersion of treatments among
farmers.
To explore in more detail decision-making from crop to
crop within a game, associations between recent flood
events and other variables with decisions to stock low,
medium, or high were analysed. Nominal or polytomous
regression was chosen as an appropriate tool for analysing
such associations, because the outcome variable of interest,
stocking density, was categorical and had three levels.
Results
Likelihood of event
The first set of hypotheses explored how the likelihood of
flood events influences risk decisions, specifically:
H1a The greater the likelihood of a flood, the lower the
profit.
H1b The greater the likelihood of a flood, the lower the
density chosen.
H1c Farmers find it harder to learn the likelihood of rare
than common risks.
The first two hypotheses follow directly from game goal
of maximizing profits and general information provided on
the structure of pay-offs at the start. The third hypothesis is
based on the logic that when events happen, more often it is
easier to get information about likelihoods and outcomes
than if the event rarely happens.
When floods were more frequent, farmers’ raw profit
(CP) declined (Table 3), as would be expected from pay-
offs in treatments. After adjustment for expected pay-offs
however, there was no significant difference (RSP);
implying that increased flood risk and thus losses, did not
affect decision-making performance once taken into
account differences in expected pay-offs. Hypothesis H1a
was thus only supported in the obvious case.
Farmers on average reduced their stocking densities
(MDL) when faced with higher flood risks as predicted
under hypothesis H1b, but the difference was primarily
between the first two lower levels of risk, and the latter
three treatments. There was a significant trend towards
fewer optimal decisions with higher level of flood risks
(ODI, Table 3). Again, contrary to initial hypothesis (H1c),
farmers appeared to learn better when flood risks were low
than when they were high (RLR); but after adjustment for
actual flood events experienced in each half of the game
(RSRLR), the difference was no longer significant.
The qualitative interviews suggest that the key features
of the game were understood and reflected important
dimensions of decision-making about risks. The difficulty
of frequent floods was recognized: ‘‘when it floods fre-
quently it is awful. I shifted to the middle option. Scared of
high risks. Choose high scared will lose a lot; choose low
worried make too little.’’ Post-game, many farmers iden-
tified low probability of flood games as the most enjoyable,
as they could make a lot of profit: ‘‘I liked the game where
it only flooded two times; it was easy to adapt to the
conditions and invest a lot in each round.’’ In recalling the
last game played, however, farmers tended to overestimate
the number of floods when rare (P = 0.1) and underesti-
mate them otherwise (Supplement 6).
With a few exceptions, most farmers found the game to
reflect key elements in their real-life decisions: ‘‘It is like
the real-life situation. You can make a profit or a loss. It
depends on natural disasters. Rearing fish is risky: There
Table 3 Effects of likelihood
of flood event
Treatment Flood risk CP RSP MDL ODI RLR RSRLR
T1 0.1 1090 50.2 2.11 0.36 56.7 3.30
T2 0.2 806 59.7 2.10 0.35 45.8 1.63
T3 0.3 452 -2.2 1.99 0.38 16.9 -0.70
T4 0.4 131 -28.5 2.04 0.27 10.7 -1.33
T5 0.5 -104 29 1.99 0.30 -8.2 -1.56
Test Conclusion linear ?H1a .01 -H1a ns ?H1b .01 #H1c .01 #H1c .001 -H1c ns
Treatment means for six decision and outcome measures and result of hypothesis tests using a priori
planned contrasts
Abbreviations are as in Table 2
? Hypothesis supported; - hypothesis rejected; # support for opposite relation
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are risks every crop if we rear fish.’’ There is a risk of
losses due to water conditions. If invest too little, take too
small a risk, then gains on investment are not worth the
time spent. ‘‘It is about investing, investing in fish farming.
If you stock a lot the risk is high, if encounter bad condi-
tions you lose a lot; if you stock a little and encounter bad
conditions you lose a little.’’ When water and climate
conditions look good, farmers invest fully, but when con-
ditions are poor, then they are more cautious: ‘‘It is very
similar to rearing fish in reality, because in reality when
rear fish it is like this. When it rains a lot, if it is me I will
not increase investments, not stock high. I won’t stock
much, will reduce densities.’’ Another explained how in the
dry season they stocked 20 cages, whereas in the wet
season only ten, because there were fewer safe sites and
exposure to high flows results in injuries to fish. The results
of the interviews suggest that the pay-off matrix was, at
least in general terms, understood and similar to real world
with respect to stocking decisions and flood risks.
Magnitude of consequences
The second set of hypotheses explored how the magnitude
of flood impacts influences risk decisions, specifically:
H2a The larger the magnitude of flood impacts, the
lower the profit.
H2b The larger the magnitude of flood impacts, the
lower the density chosen.
H2c Farmers find it harder to learn about consequences
from small than large magnitude events.
When floods had larger impacts, farmers’ raw profit
(CP) declined (Table 4), as would be expected from pay-
offs in treatments. After adjustment for expected pay-offs,
a similar trend was present; however, there were only some
significant differences (RSP) when floods were unlikely.
Hypothesis H2a was partly supported.
Farmers did not reduce their stocking densities (MDL)
when faced with higher impacts from floods as predicted
under hypothesis H2b (Table 4). Again, as above, and
contrary to initial hypothesis (H2c), farmers appeared to
learn better when flood impacts were low than when they
were high (RLR). Similarly, they were more likely to select
optimal densities when impacts were low (ODI); although
means were not as easy to separate as in the case of the
RLR measure.
In interviews, fish farmers explained their responses to
large and normal flood impacts. In case of very large los-
ses, one explained: ‘‘if we lose a lot like this then invest a
little then we change strategy and carefully build back up
from the losses. With big losses, start low, have a bit of
savings then shift to middle.’’ Some farmers said they liked
the latter games more than the earlier ones, because by then
they felt they could understand how to play and make
better decisions based on understanding of the magnitude
of flood impacts: ‘‘The last game, I made a profit. At the
start did not know what effect floods would have. After
playing a while I felt I knew how to play.’’
Variable likelihood
The third set of hypotheses explored how changes in the
likelihood of flood events influence risk decisions,
specifically:
H3a When likelihood of a flood changes profits are
lower.
H3b When likelihood of a flood changes more likely to
choose lower densities.
H3c Farmers find it harder to learn the likelihood of a
risk when they are changing.
Table 4 Effects of magnitude of flood impact
Treatment Likelihood of flood Magnitude of impact CP RSP MDL ODI RLR RSRLR
T7 0.3 0.5 715a 20.8 2.09 .348a 35.2a 0.37
T3 0.3 1 452b -2.2 1.99 .381a 16.9b -0.70
T6 0.3 2.1 -108c -28.3 2.10 .240b -13.8c -2.84
Hypothesis tests ?H2a -H2a -H2b #H2c #H2c -H2c
T1 0.1 1 1090a 50.3a 2.12 .357a 56.7a 3.30a
T19 0.1 2.4 820b 5.9ab 2.05 .329a 37.9b -3.27b
T20 0.1 8 -129c -48.7b 2.12 .217b -32.4c -12.8c
Hypothesis tests ?H2a ?H2a -H2b #H2c #H2c #H2C
Treatment means for six decision and outcome measures and result of hypothesis tests using a priori planned contrasts
Magnitude of impact is ratio of pay-off loss in event of flood for the treatment related to standard pay-off (see: Supplement 5)
Abbreviations are as in Table 2
? Hypothesis supported; - hypothesis rejected; # support for opposite relation
Learning about climate-related risks: decisions of fish farmers in a role-playing simulation… 1487
123
The idea behind these three hypothesis is that uncer-
tainty makes evaluating risks more difficult (H3c), thus
making it harder to succeed (H3a), and in response, farmers
become more cautious (H3b). To explore these three
hypotheses, we classified games into three types, based on
a difference of 2 or more floods in first versus second ten
crops: increasing, unchanged, and decreasing. There was
no support for any of the three hypotheses, and in some
cases, support for opposite or other patterns (Supplement
7). Farmers chose riskier options (MDL) when likelihoods
varied in either direction. When likelihoods were changing,
raw profits (CP) were higher; but analysis of standardized
scores (RSP) suggests that this just reflected differences in
pay-offs. The pattern for RLR was what would be expected
given classification of games. Even after standardization
for expected pay-offs, however, rates of learning (RSRLR)
were highest in games with decreasing risks and lowest
with increasing risks.
The key point is that in the game, as in real life, the risks
are imperfectly known: ‘‘It is like rearing fish for real.
When we rear fish we don’t know future risks or what will
happen in the future. This year: will there be a shortage of
water? Will it flood? Will the river be dry? When we invest
we know there will be risks, but not how big they will be.’’
Fish farmers understood the game as being about making
decisions in situations where you do not know in advance
what will happen: ‘‘a situation in which cannot predict
when fish will die, when it will flood.’’
Variable consequences
The fourth, and final set of hypotheses under research
question 1, explored how variability in the magnitude of
flood impacts influences risk decisions, specifically:
H4a The more variable the magnitude of flood impacts,
the lower the profit.
H4b The more variable the magnitude of flood impacts,
the lower the density chosen.
H4c Farmers find it harder to learn when consequences
are more variable.
All planned contrasts were not significant (T10, T11 in
Supplement 5), implying that there was no support for the
three hypotheses. As there were no significant differences,
a detailed table of averages for each of the measures is not
shown.
Information
The fifth set of hypotheses, under research question 2,
explored how prior information on the likelihood of floods
influences risk decisions, specifically:
H5a Knowing likelihood of floods beforehand increases
the profit.
H5b Knowing likelihood of floods is high beforehand
lowers the density chosen, and if low then raises the
density chosen.
H5c Farmers find it easier to learn when likelihoods of
floods are known beforehand than when they are
not known.
The third hypothesis reflects the idea that when the
likelihoods of a flood are already known, a farmer needs
only to estimate the impact, which is easier then when must
estimate both. With better understanding, one would expect
better choices (H5b) and thus, overall performance (H5a).
All planned contrasts in this set of hypotheses were not
significant, so no support for any of these hypotheses.
Again, as there were no significant differences, a table of
summary means for each treatment is not shown.
Although on average, farmers did not do better with
information, when asked what game they liked to play
most, some farmers identified these treatments. Several
said they liked it when they were given information about
the number of floods to expect, as this allowed them to
make more strategic decisions: ‘‘I liked the game that told
us it would flood once in 10 times. I could decide to invest
a lot and only lose once in ten times.’’ At the same time, it
is clear not all farmers were able to make use of the
information provided, in part, because of a tendency to play
quickly: The game ‘‘is good, but I cannot think fast enough.
I don’t know what to do. I was muddled.’’ Similarly, other
farmers argued that if they concentrated as much as they do
in the real world, then they could figure out what to do
each round, but they did not have the time to do so.
Adaptation
The sixth set of hypotheses, under research question 2,
explored how investment in adaptation influences risk
decisions, specifically:
H6a If there is investment in adaptation or insurance,
then farmers are more likely to gain higher profit
when floods are frequent than when they are rare.
H6b If there is investment in adaptation or insurance,
then farmers are more likely to choose a higher
density.
H6c Farmers find it easier to learn when have invested in
adaptation.
The first hypothesis follows directly from the reduced
impact of floods. The second is more speculative but is
based on the idea that these investments reduce perceived
risks. The last hypothesis is based on the argument that
farmers would learn that having invested in adaptation,
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losses when it floods will be reduced and thus pay-offs less
variable.
The first hypothesis, H6a, was supported for raw pay-
offs (CP), but not standardized pay-offs (RSP, Table 5).
There was no evidence that adaptation investments led to
higher risk-taking (MDL, H6b, Table 5). Farmers appear to
learn more easily when investing in adaptation, and there is
reduced variability in pay-offs only when flood risks are
high (RLR, ODI, H6c); but after standardization (RSRLR),
the effect disappears. One difference farmers noted was
that in the game there was no warning or opportunity to
prepare for individual flood events, as there is in real life;
this particular set of treatments only helped understand the
effects of that option when it was used.
Investing in a fixed-compensation insurance—like
index-based schemes rather than one that depends on actual
losses—led to better decisions (ODI) than one which
reduces flood impacts by 50 %, for which expected pay-
offs (Supplement 2) were identical (ODI: T16 versus T18,
Table 5). Post-game some farmers noted they liked the
games with ‘‘insurance as even though there was a risk,
when it flooded there was some help.’’
Fish farmers, however, also complained that the game
provided no information or opportunities for making
adjustments to decisions or reducing risks in other ways
during a crop. They argued: ‘‘in the real world can get news
and information,’’ and that they can ‘‘look at weather
conditions, note that this year is dry, stock less and check
information about water levels on the web’’.
One final result at the level of individual fish farmer
should be underlined. The average random standardized
profit (RSP) of 40 % of individual fish farmers who each
played six or seven games each, was less than zero. This
implies that a substantial fraction of fish farmers did not
do better, overall, than would expect from random
choices.
Learning strategies within a game
We next looked more closely at decisions within a game,
and what learning strategies farmers might be using by
analysing sequences of decisions within a game, in par-
ticular, following floods. To investigate the effects of a
flood event on subsequent stocking density decisions,
separate nominal (or polytomous) regression models were
estimated for situations in which the last stocking decision
was low, medium, or high (Supplement 8). In each model,
the outcome variable was ‘stocking density’ chosen this
crop (which also has three possible values). The reference
category was set to no change in density for each model.
Overall, the tendency was to repeat the last decision and
increasingly so as density increased: low (46 %), mid
(49 %), and high (54 %). In each model, the candidate
predictors were as follows: flood last crop, gender, age
group, late round (crop number [15), and region. The
findings with respect to floods will be discussed first and in
most detail.
The effects of a flood in previous crop on the next
stocking decision depended on the density, and thus pay-
off outcome from the previous crop (Fig. 3). If the last
stocking density was high and a flood occurred, farmers
were more likely to reduce stocking densities in the next
round (rightmost panel, Fig. 3). If density chosen in the last
crop was low, however, farmers were more likely to make
the riskiest choice if they had just experienced a flood
(leftmost panel). At low densities, it should be noted, flood
effects were modest. If the density chosen for the last crop
was intermediate, farmers responded to a flood by changing
density: taking both lower and higher densities more often
than continuing to choose the mid-option, though generally
reduce more than increase (central panel).
The key findings for other predictors apart from floods
in Supplement 8 will now be briefly considered. It should
Table 5 Effects of investments
in adaptation and insurance
Contrast Prob. flood CP RSP MDL ODI RLR RSRLR
T1 versus T15 0.1 ?*** Ns Ns ns ?** ns
T3 versus T16 0.3 ns Ns Ns ?** Ns ns
T5 versus T17 0.5 -*** Ns Ns -** -*** ns
Hypothesis tests ?H6a -H6a -H6b ?H6c if P hi ?H6c if p hi
T16 versus T18 0.3 ns Ns Ns -** Ns ns
T3 versus T18 0.3 ns ns Ns ns ns ns
Hypothesis tests
Treatment means for six decision and outcome measures and result of hypothesis tests using a priori
planned contrasts
Abbreviations are as in Table 2
* P\ 0.05, ** P\ 0.01, *** P\ 0.001
? Hypothesis supported; - hypothesis rejected; # support for opposite relation
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be underlined that these associations are after mutual
adjustments for other factors in the model. Women
responded to floods more cautiously than men. Women
were more likely than men to reduce densities by one step
(H ? M) following a flood; they were also less likely to
increase densities from a low level following a flood
(L ? M or L ? H, odds ratios\ 1.0). Young and old
farmers tended to maintain the same density more than
middle-aged farmers, and being less likely to make a big
reduction (H ? L) or increase (L ? H). In later rounds,
farmers were less likely to move to intermediate densities
following a flood (H ? M or L ? M), suggesting that by
then they were clear on the appropriate level of risk to take.
Regional differences in response to floods were strong and
consistent. Farmers from the Upper Nan region were more
likely to change density after a flood event than those in the
other three regions (odds ratios\ 1.0).
Fish farmers understood that ‘‘each time you stock fish it
is like an experiment. You cannot predict what will happen.
It is practice in analysing investments: which option would
be good to choose next?’’ They also acknowledged that
different places have different risks, so when starting in a
new place they initially began with small investments, that
is, less risky decisions. The game ‘‘makes us think when
we invest: In this new situation should we invest a little or
a lot? Do we dare to take a risk? In a new place who would
take the high risk? In a new place you need to take less
risk.’’
Discussion
In this game, selecting low stocking was a relatively certain
bet compared to high stocking where differences in pay-
offs if it flooded or not were large. As would be expected,
more frequent or larger impact floods reduced cumulative
profits (Tables 3, 4). Farmers slightly reduced their stock-
ing densities when playing in games with high likelihood
of floods, but did not do so as expected when impacts were
larger. Farmers found it harder to choose the optimal
density when floods were common or had large impacts.
Most laboratory studies on learning from experience sug-
gest participants underweight rare events (Erev et al. 2010).
In the context of climate-related risks and a role-playing
game situation, the findings suggest that there may also be
an emotional component, rather than purely an analytical
response to losses (Slovic et al. 2004). Players, for
instance, may sometimes seek to recover as quickly as
possible from a recent major loss and take more risks, or,
alternatively, feel overwhelmed by a large impact event or
repeated losses, thereby losing sense of control over risks,
and as a result, become overly risk-averse.
Apart from evidence about effects of likelihood and
consequence, we also explored several other situational
factors which might influence risk decisions following the
conceptual framework presented earlier (Fig. 1). Uncer-
tainty in risks as variation in likelihoods produced some
unexpected effects. Raw profits were higher in games with
change than those with unchanging risks (Supplement 7).
Again, contrary to initial hypothesis, farmers appeared to
learn about risks better when they were decreasing, and do
worst when they were increasing. This latter finding has
particular significance when considering potential adverse
impacts of climate change, for which many key risks are
increasing, but perceptions of policy or planners lack
urgency (Runhaar et al. 2012; Moser 2010). In this study,
however, uncertainty in risks—as greater variation in out-
comes—did not significantly reduce profits, result in lower
densities being chosen or reduce rates at which learning
takes place, as might be expected. One explanation is that
learning from experience in the role-playing game was
already challenging under conditions of fixed risks.
Farmers concentrated hard when they played the game,
but it was not easy to play. Many did not do much better
than would expect with random choices. This is a telling
finding, because the game was designed to reflect the series
of decisions a fish farmer must make based on accumula-
tion of experience. Moreover, farmers validated that the
game matched reality in key features around investment
decisions. Against a background of variation in pay-offs,
the likelihood and consequences of adverse events like
floods are hard to estimate with much precision, and thus
Fig. 3 Effects of a flood in previous crop on subsequent stocking
decisions. Odds ratios and 95 % confidence intervals from nominal
regression model with multiple predictors
1490 P. Lebel et al.
123
are not much use as a guide for subsequent decisions. The
technology interface of the game—hand-held tablets—was
itself not an obvious barrier to engagement in this popu-
lation as most fish farmers already had their own mobile
phones, and the game interface was simple. Rather, the
challenge seemed to be more one of detail in recalling past
impacts and capacities to estimate pay-offs and risks.
Providing information about likelihoods prior to a game
had no impact on performance or decisions. One expla-
nation for these findings is that many farmers did not
understand or translate a statement like chance of ‘‘1 in 10
times’’ or ‘‘1 in 2 times’’ into meaningful information to
use in their choices. At the same time, some farmers did
perform well in these types of games and, in interviews,
stated that knowing likelihoods was very helpful in making
decisions in those games. Many studies have shown that
people have difficulty in understanding and using ratios,
proportions and probabilities (Reyna and Brainerd 2008).
Another possible explanation for lack of hypothesized
effect of information might be probability matching, where
decision-makers focus on matching choice probabilities
with their selections rather than making selections based on
the most likely outcome—a strategy that would maximize
their cumulative pay-offs (James and Koehler 2011).
In games with compulsory insurance, farmers did better
when floods were more frequent as would expect based on
pay-offs, but not better than that. There was no evidence that
adaptation investments led to higher risk-taking (Table 5).
Farmers play significantly improved within a game when
they had invested in adaptation, but only when flood risks
were high. This may relate to feelings of confidence when
losses are reduced (Weber 2010). Investing in a fixed
amount compensation insurance—like an index-based
scheme rather than one that depends on actual losses—led to
better decisions than one which reduces flood impacts by
50 %, for which expected pay-offs were identical. This
suggests that farmers appreciate reduced ambiguity with
respect to outcomes. A study of coffee farmers in Costa Rica
(Alpizar et al. 2011) and another of mixed field crop farmers
in Peru (Engle-Warnick et al. 2011), both found that ambi-
guity made it even less likely for farmers to change prac-
tices, for instance, invest in new adaptation options.
Place-related factors—like region of origin—were sig-
nificant for some of the associations with learning about
risks. Regional differences in immediate responses to
floods (Supplement 8), for example, might be explained by
differences in experiences, as in the case of the Upper Nan
River flow modification; whereby dam operations have
large consequences for seasonal risks of extreme flows
(Lebel et al. 2015c). We suggest that farmers entered the
role-playing game with a set of expectations about likeli-
hoods and consequences based on their own personal
experiences, and then updated these or their mental model
when playing the game. Different groups of expert stake-
holders appear to have distinct mental models for adapta-
tion to climate change (Otto-Banaszak et al. 2011). Further
in-depth investigations of farmers’ perceptions and atti-
tudes towards climate-related risks are needed, to more
completely understand how beliefs and concepts influence
risk management decisions and support for various adap-
tation actions.
The above findings help, in several ways, improve
understanding of how fish farmers make stocking decisions
in the face of risks that are imperfectly known, and may be
changing (Fig. 1). The findings caution against placing
unrealistically, optimistic assumptions about how fast
individuals can learn about risks from monitoring and
experience. Learning from experience is not easy as there
is often a tendency to repeat last decisions despite poor
outcomes or a problem of inertia (Dutt and Gonzalez
2012b). Farmers who switch densities frequently, on the
other hand, especially after negative events, may be
searching for information that could inform alternative
strategies (Weber and Johnson 2009). Switching was
observed in this study: farmers were more likely to reduce
stocking densities in the next round if they had just chosen
high and it flooded, and to do the reverse if they had chosen
low and it flooded (Fig. 3). At the same time, the findings
of this study also caution against assuming information
about likelihoods of extreme events has high values: such
information may be difficult to communicate in a way that
is easily understood and related to decisions which must be
taken.
The findings suggest that decision-support systems
(DSSs) for aquaculture need to take into account, how
recent experiences and other factors influence risk per-
ceptions and decisions. An extensive review of experiences
with DSS for farmers in Australia, however, noted that
DSS should not aim to optimize recommendations, but
rather help farmers explore options and understand their
own intuitions about problems and solutions (Hochman and
Carberry 2011). An example of such an approach is the
prototype decision-support system developed for catfish
farmers in Vietnam (Le et al. 2012). To develop a useful
system for inland tilapia aquaculture, it would be important
to also consider key non-climate-related risks, such as costs
of fish fry and feed, and risks of disease (Lebel et al. 2015a;
Belton et al. 2009).
This study also had some important limitations, mostly
related to the simplifications of reality made in the game,
which implies a need to treat some of the findings with care
and suggest potential areas for further research. First, the
sequence of stocking decisions made and outcomes expe-
rienced in the simulation game were seconds apart,
whereas those in the real world are separated by several
months. Second, as no cash transactions were involved, it is
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likely that the emotional elements of the decision—in-
cluding things like fear of losing investment—dread of
extreme floods and their impacts on farmer’s households,
would not be fully replicated in the role-playing game.
Third, the games were played by individuals, whereas in
the real world, farmers talk to each other and learn about
risk levels from others, and not just their own experiences.
Finally, in the game farmers had to make only one deci-
sion—how much to stock—whereas decision-making in
the real world involves considering multiple risks and
trade-offs or interactions among them.
The latter limitations are perhaps the easiest to address.
Future versions of the role-playing games could consider
multiple risks by explicitly considering a cropping calendar
with risks of floods, low flows, and disease that vary
monthly and, in the case of low flows, are relatively more
knowable in advance. Opportunity costs of delaying
stocking, and income losses from harvesting early or late,
could also be incorporated. Players might be given the
option to invest in adaptation or risk reduction measures
before stocking each crop. With more complex criteria to
consider, it will be important to put additional effort into
the communication of information about game condi-
tions—for example, using visualizations and interactive
sliders to specify choices—so that this information is well
understood by fish farmers playing the game. Experimental
treatments could compare the effects of providing and not
providing different sorts of risk-related information. An
experiment might also be set up to compare performance
when playing in groups against playing alone, to help
understand effects of communication and interaction on
learning about risks. This would require slowing down the
game so people can discuss between decisions if they wish
to. The problem of virtual compression of time in a sim-
ulation game is difficult to address methodologically, but
potentially important as the time between decisions is
likely to influence recall from memory and opportunities
for reflection on experiences. Including delays between
decisions so farmers feel they have time to review infor-
mation and reflect may be a practical way to reduce the
artificiality arising from compressed time. One way this
might be done that would also help with understanding of
information, would be to use more animations or visual-
izations to show magnitudes of gains and losses rather than
just reporting numbers and simple profit or loss graphic as
was done in the current version of the game. The findings
about decision behaviour from these more complex and
realistic role-playing games, could then be explored using
decision models. Relatively simple and stylized models
based on instance-based learning theory, for instance, are
known to perform reasonably well on a wide range of tasks,
including probability learning and making repeated choices
(Lejarraga et al. 2010; Erev et al. 2010).
Conclusion
Taken together, the methods and findings of this study have
significant implications for future work on climate risk
management, especially in aquaculture; but maybe also
beneficial in some other agricultural decision-making set-
tings. The combination of experimental, role-playing and
qualitative methods was novel and proved helpful to
obtaining a deeper understanding of decision behaviour in a
specific context. The experimental tests imply that some
common or otherwise reasonable assumptions about how
farmers evaluate risks based on experience, need to be
revisited. In particular, it is difficult to learn with much
precision from a relatively short series of decisions about the
likelihoods or consequences of an adverse climate event,
especially if those risks are increasing. This novel finding is
likely to be robust as it was made in a relatively simple
decision context; with multiple risks and more contextual
factors to consider, learning about levels of risks from indi-
vidual experience is likely to be even more difficult. In the
real world, however, information about risks and impacts are
shared and there is more time to reflect upon experiences.
The importance of learning in groups and other sources, as
well as having enough time for reflection, deserves further
study. Past experiences in different locations and from recent
flood events were shown to influence risk-taking behaviour,
implying the need to adjust risk information by site and
recent history of impact when providing decision support. An
outstanding challenge is to effectively communicate risk-re-
lated information in a way that is widely understood, and can
be acted upon. Insights from experiments with role-playing
games, combined with other work on risk perceptions and
experience of impacts in the field, should be useful for the
design of future risk communication activities and decision
support to improve climate risk management in aquaculture;
and, ultimately, developing realistic strategies for enabling
climate change adaptation.
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